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Abstract. The paper explores a spatial duopoly of firms under Stackelberg 
competition, when one of the firms is a leader in term of product volume. 
The equilibrium spatial strategies of firms are found. In the process of the 
analysis of equilibrium stability, it is proved that the transport tariff is a 
bifurcation parameter for firms. It was found that the change in the central 
agglomeration strategy to the differentiation strategy occurs at the point of 
transcritical bifurcation. The conditions for full coverage of the markets for 
both strategies are defined. It is obtained that the information asymmetry 
leads to asymmetry of equilibrium locations of firms. It is established that 
under differentiation strategy, the follower can due to the space factor 
overcome information asymmetry in the nearest markets and get a profit 
more than the leader. 
Key words: linear city, agglomeration, differentiation, Stackelberg 
competition, transcritical bifurcation. 
 
Introduction 
 
In search of a solution to the Bertrand paradox, Hotelling proposed to take into 
account the factor of space under the price competition of firms. In Hotelling's 
linear city model (Hotelling, 1929), two firms compete on a segment with a unit 
demand at each point. Firms optimize their prices and location on the segment. 
Transportation delivery costs of goods are borne by consumers. Hotelling found 
that in an equilibrium state, firms would be minimally spatially differentiated, since 
they would be located in the center. This conclusion of the model analysis 
subsequently became a famous “principle of minimal differentiation”. 
In further research, the Hotelling model has developed in the following areas: 
– an increase in the number of firms (Brenner, 2005, Patri and Sacco, 2017); 
– increase the dimension of space (Irmen and Thisse, 1998, Mazalov and 
Sakaguchi, 2003); 
– the complexity of the type of transport costs function (D’Aspremont, 
Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, Economides, 1986); 
– generalization of the consumer’s distribution density (Neven, 1986, Gupta, 
Pal and Sarkar, 1997, Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995); 
– consideration of the Cournot competition (Hamilton, Klein, Sheshinski and 
Slutsky, 1994, Scrimitore, 2011, Hamilton, Thisse and Weskamp, 1989) and 
Stackelberg competition (Anderson, 1987). 
In the Anderson (1987), a linear city model is investigated under Stackelberg 
competition, when firms optimize their locations and prices. It is found that the 
outcome is asymmetric in terms of Stackelberg equilibrium locations, prices and 
profits. In this paper, we investigate a linear city model in the framework of 
Stackelberg competition, when firms optimize their locations and supply volumes. 
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1. The linear city model 
 
Two firms sell homogeneous goods on the unit segment, at each point of which is 
the consumer market x , [ ]10,x∈ . The distance of the firms from zero point is 
equal 1x  and 2x  accordingly, and 21 xx ≤ . Each firm faces linear transportation 
costs of t  to move one good unit per one unit of distance. Consumer arbitrage is 
assumed to be prohibitively costly. 
The linear demand curve in the market x : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )xqxqxp 211 −−= , 
 
where ( )xp  – the price in the market x , ( )xq1 , ( )xq2  – the quantities supplied of 
firms in the market x , a minimum price, at which there is no demand (market 
potential), is equal to 1. 
Let us assume that firms supply products to all markets, i.e. ( ) 01 >xq , 
( ) 02 >xq . 
The profits of firms in the market x : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
,maxxxtxqxqxqxF
xq,x 11
12111 1 →−⋅−−−⋅=  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
.maxxxtxqxqxqxF
xq,x 22
22122 1 →−⋅−−−⋅=  
 
The competitive game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the firms 
simultaneously select their locations. In the second stage, at the given location 
decisions, the firms simultaneously choose their supplied quantities. The 
equilibrium of the model is solved by backward induction. 
 
2. The Nash equilibrium 
 
According to the backward induction method we begin with the second stage. Let 
us assume that firms optimize supply volumes under the conditions of the 
Stackelberg information asymmetry. The firm 2 (leader) knows the strategy of the 
firm 1 regarding the supply volume and has the right of first move. The firm 1 
(follower) does not possess such information and makes decisions after leader. 
Solving the first-order condition yields the reaction curve of the firm-follower: 
 
( ) ( )
2
1 12
1
xxtxq
xq
−⋅−−
= .                                           (1) 
 
The firm-leader knows the follower's reaction curve (1) and incorporates it 
into his profit function: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
.max
xxtxxtxqxq
xF
xq,x 222
21 1222
2 →
−⋅+−⋅⋅−−⋅
=  
 
The equilibrium supply volumes of firms to the market x : 
 
( )
4
231 21
1
xxtxxt
xq*
−⋅⋅+−⋅⋅−
= , 
 
( )
2
21 12
2
xxtxxt
xq*
−⋅+−⋅⋅−
= . 
 
A coverage conditions for all markets: 
 
( )
21
1 23
10
xxxx
txq*
−⋅−−⋅
<⇔> ,                                    (2) 
 
( )
12
2 2
10
xxxx
txq*
−−−⋅
<⇔> .                                       (3) 
 
Substituting into (2) the values: 01 =x , 12 =x , 1=x  (maximum value of the 
denominator), we find that at 31<t  all markets are serviced regardless of the 
location of firms. Substituting into (2) the values: 211 =x , 212 =x , 0=x  
(minimum value of the denominator), we find that at any location of firms 
servicing all markets is possible only at 2<t . Let us note that in the equilibrium 
state, the location of firms depends on the transport tariff. Therefore, the analysis of 
conditions (2)-(3) will be continued after finding equilibrium. 
The equilibrium profits of firms in the market x : 
 
( ) ( )
16
231 221
1
xxtxxt
xF*
−⋅⋅+−⋅⋅−
= , 
(4) 
( ) ( )
8
21 212
2
xxtxxt
xF*
−⋅+−⋅⋅−
= . 
 
It follows from (4) that the ratio between the profits of the leader and follower 
in the market x  depends on their location relative to the market x . In the case of 
agglomeration or symmetric location relative to the market x , the leader's profit 
exceeds the follower's profit exactly 2 times, how in the classical model with one 
market. A closer distance to the market x  strengthens the market power of the 
leader and vice versa:    
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )2112 2 xxxxsignxFxFsign ** −−−=⋅− . 
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In the first stage each firm selects a profit-maximizing location at a given 
location of the competitor. In the subsequent analysis, we assume that the 
equilibrium location of the firms obeys the condition: 
 
211 ≤x , 212 ≥x .                                                  (5) 
 
So, let us start with firm 1. The total profit of firm 1 in all markets: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxFdxxFdxxFdxxFF
x
*
x
x
*
x
** ∫∫∫∫ ++==
1
11
0
1
1
0
11
2
2
1
1
, 
 
( ) ( )( ) +−⋅⋅+−⋅⋅−=⋅ ∫
1
0
2
211 23116
x
dxxxtxxtF  
( ) ( )( ) +−⋅⋅+−⋅⋅−+ ∫
2
1
2
21 231
x
x
dxxxtxxt  
         ( ) ( )( )∫ −⋅⋅+−⋅⋅−+
1
2
21
2
231
x
dxxxtxxt . (6) 
 
After integrating and identical transformations (6), we obtain: 
 
( ) ( )
+
⋅
⋅⋅+⋅⋅−
−
⋅
⋅⋅+⋅⋅−⋅
=⋅
t
xtxt
t
xtxtF
3
231
5
221216
3
21
3
21
1  
                 
                
( ) ( )
t
xtxtt
t
xtxt
⋅
⋅⋅−⋅⋅+−
−
⋅
⋅⋅−⋅⋅+⋅
+
3
231
15
3314 321
3
21 . 
 
The optimal location is defined by the necessary condition: 
 
( ) ( ) 021434224
3
16
2221
2
1
1
1 =−+−⋅⋅⋅+⋅−⋅⋅+⋅⋅−⋅⋅=
∂
∂
⋅
⋅
txxttxtxxt
x
F
t
.   (7) 
 
The sufficient condition for the existence of profit maximum for the firm 1: 
 
t
txxtxtxt
x
F
t ⋅
−⋅
−<⇔<⋅+⋅⋅−−⋅⋅=
∂
∂
⋅
⋅ 4
2303424
3
8
21212
1
1
2
.             (8) 
 
The necessary condition for the existence of the equilibrium location for firm 
1 is the nonnegativity of the discriminant of the square equation (7):  
 
( ) ( )( ) 0416208134 2221 ≥+⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅⋅= xtxtD .                          (9) 
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It is easy to make sure that 01 ≥D  at 212 ≥x . Therefore, due to condition 
(5), in the equilibrium state the discriminant (9) is always nonnegative. 
Let us note that information asymmetry about location of firms can lead to 
monopolization of the city. With the right of first move, firm 2 (leader) can will 
located in the market 212 <x , create a barrier to entry for firm 1 and monopolize 
all markets. Therefore, we assume that firm 2 is the leader only in the second stage, 
and in the first stage, when choosing a location, firms compete under Cournot 
model. 
The roots of the square equation (7) are: 
 
( )
t
D
t
txx*
⋅
−
⋅
−⋅
−=
84
23 1
211 ,    ( ) t
D
t
txx*
⋅
+
⋅
−⋅
−=
84
23 1
221 . 
 
The root ( )21*x  does not satisfy the sufficient condition (8) and therefore is not 
further analyzed. The root ( )11*x  for 212 >x  always satisfies the sufficient 
condition (8), for 212 =x  the condition (8) holds for: 
 
( ) 320
4
230
8
2
1 ≠⇔>
⋅
−⋅
⇔>
⋅
t
t
t
t
D
. 
 
The total profit of firm 2 in all markets: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dxxFdxxFdxxFdxxFF
x
*
x
x
*
x
** ∫∫∫∫ ++==
1
22
0
2
1
0
22
2
2
1
1
. 
 
( ) ( )( ) +−⋅+−⋅⋅−=⋅ ∫
1
0
2
122 218
x
dxxxtxxtF  
( ) ( )( ) +−⋅+−⋅⋅−+ ∫
2
1
2
1221
x
x
dxxxtxxt  
                                                          
( ) ( )( )∫ −⋅+−⋅⋅−+
1
2
12
2
21
x
dxxxtxxt . (10) 
 
After integrating and identical transformations (10), we obtain: 
 
( ) ( )
+
⋅
⋅+⋅⋅−
−
⋅
⋅⋅+⋅⋅−⋅
=⋅
t
xtxt
t
xtxtF
3
21
9
22128
3
12
3
12
2  
           
( ) ( )
t
xtxtt
t
xtxt
⋅
⋅−⋅⋅+−
−
⋅
⋅−⋅+⋅
+
3
21
9
14 312
3
12 . 
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The optimal location is defined by the necessary condition: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0212222 1221212
2
2 =−−⋅⋅−−−⋅−−⋅=
∂
∂
⋅ xxtxxtxx
x
F
t
.               (11) 
 
The sufficient condition for the existence of profit maximum for the firm 2: 
 
( )
t
txxxxt
x
F
t
10111 12212
2
2
2 −
+>⇔<−−+⋅=
∂
∂
⋅ .                      (12) 
 
The necessary condition for the existence of the equilibrium location for firm 
2 is the nonnegativity of the discriminant of the square equation (11): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 021214 122 ≥−⋅−⋅+−⋅= xtttD .                              (13) 
 
It is easy to make sure that 02 ≥D  at 211 ≤x . Therefore, due to condition 
(5), in the equilibrium state, the discriminant (13) is always nonnegative.  
The roots of the square equation (11) are: 
 
( )
t
D
t
txx*
⋅
−
−
+=
2
1 2
112 ,    ( ) t
D
t
txx*
⋅
+
−
+=
2
1 2
122 . 
 
The root ( )12*x  does not satisfy the sufficient condition (12) and therefore is 
not further analyzed. The root ( )22*x  for 211 <x  always satisfies the sufficient 
condition (12), for 211 =x  the condition (12) holds for: 
 
( ) 1010
2
2
2 ≠⇔>
−
⇔>
⋅
t
t
t
t
D
. 
 
Thus, we received the reaction curves of firms: 
 
 
( ) ( )
t
xtxtt
xx
⋅
+⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅−
+=
4
4162081332 22
2
21 ,                     (14)                                                           
 
( ) ( ) ( )
t
xtttt
xx 1
2
12
21211 −⋅−⋅+−+−
+= .                                     (15)                                                                           
 
To solve the system of equations (14)-(15) we introduce a new variable: 
 
( ) ( ) 41620813 222 +⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅= xtxtw , 0≥w . 
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Then we obtain from (14): 
 
t
wtxx
⋅
−⋅−
+=
4
32
21 ,  ( )tt
ttwx
−⋅⋅
−⋅+⋅−
=
28
42013 22
2 .                        (16) 
 
Substituting (16) into (15), and solving with respect to w , we obtain: 
 
tw ⋅−= 321 ,   3
27
2
−⋅
=
tw .                                          (17) 
 
Substituting (17) into (16), we find solutions of the system (14)-(15): 
 
2121 ==
aggagg xx ,                                                    (18) 
 
t
txdis
⋅
⋅−
=
18
78
1 ,  t
txdis
⋅
−⋅
=
18
417
2 .                                         (19) 
 
So, we obtained two equilibrium strategies for the location of firms: central 
agglomeration and dispersion. 
It follows from condition 0≥w  that the solution (18) is defined for 32≤t , 
the solution (19) is defined for 72≥t . For 21=t , the solutions (18) and (19) 
coincide. From the location condition, 21 xx ≤ , it follows that firms can apply the 
dispersion strategy only when 21≥t . 
Let us finish off an analysis of the market coverage conditions (2)-(3). Under 
central agglomeration strategy, firms will be able to serve all markets on 
condition: 
 
2
23
1
21
<⇔
−⋅−−⋅
< t
xxxx
t
aggagg
. 
 
Under dispersion strategy, firms will be able to serve all markets on condition: 
 
( ) ( ) 73501213
1
23
1
1121
<⇔
−⋅−−⋅
<⇔
−⋅−−⋅
< t
xx
t
xxxx
t disdisdisdis . 
 
Under central agglomeration strategy the firms minimize a total distance of 
traffic, therefore full market coverage may be possible with a higher transport 
tariff. 
In previous studies (Gupta, Pal and Sarkar, 1997, Hamilton, Klein, Sheshinski 
and Slutsky, 1994, Hamilton, Thisse and Weskamp, 1989) it is proved that firms in 
the Cournot equilibrium are always located symmetrically with respect to the 
center. We have obtained that the information asymmetry about supply volumes 
will lead to the asymmetry of equilibrium location of firms. It follows from (19) 
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that in the equilibrium state the firm-leader is 2 times closer to the center than the 
firm follower: 
 
( )21221 21 −⋅=− disdis xx . 
 
 
3. The analysis of the stability of equilibrium 
 
Let us analyze a stability of the solutions (18)-(19). For this we consider a two-
dimensional map: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
t
nxtnxtt
nxnx
⋅
+⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅−
+=+
4
4162081332
1 22
2
21 , 
(20) 
                      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
t
nxtttt
nxnx 1
2
12
21211
1
−⋅−⋅+−+−
+=+ , 
 
where n  is a time moment, ...,,,,n 210=  ( ) 001 =x , ( ) 102 =x .                 
As is known, the nature of the stability of fixed points is determined by their 
multipliers. The multipliers are eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in a fixed point, 
and their number is equal to the dimension of map. 
The Jacobian matrix of the map (20) in the fixed point (18): 
 
( ) 











−⋅
−
⋅−
⋅
−
=
0
12
32
20
t
t
t
t
J .                                             (21) 
 
From (21) we obtain two real multipliers: 
 
( ) ( ) 32321
2
21 <⋅−⋅−
±= t,
tt
t
,µ .                                  (22) 
 
For 121 <,µ  the fixed point is stable, for 121 >,µ  the fixed point is unstable, 
for 121 =,µ  the bifurcation occurs. 
From (22) we find that the fixed point (18) is stable at 21<t  and is unstable 
at 21>t . The loss of stability occurs at the bifurcation point: 21=t . 
The Jacobian matrix of the map (20) in a fixed point (19): 
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( ) 











+⋅
−⋅
−⋅
−⋅
=
0
12
45
27
8100
t
t
t
t
J .                                           (23) 
 
From (23) we obtain two real multipliers: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) 72271
45 2
21 >−⋅⋅+
−⋅
±= t,
tt
t
,µ .                               (24) 
 
From (24) we find that the fixed point (19) is unstable at 21<t  and is stable 
at 21>t . The acquisition of stability occurs at the bifurcation point: 21=t . 
Thus, at the value of the transport tariff 21=t , occurs a transcritical 
bifurcation, in which fixed points change a nature of stability (Fig. 1). 
The equilibrium profit dynamics of the firm-leader, depending on the transport 
tariff, is presented in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Equilibrium spatial strategies of firms depending on transportation tariffs 
 
 
21, xx
*
2x
*
1x
stable unstable
t
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Fig. 2 – Dynamics of the equilibrium profit of the firm-leader, depending on the 
transport tariff 
 
 
The Fig. 2 illustrates the effects that affect spatial strategies of firms. Before 
bifurcation point the effect of minimizing transport costs is dominate (Scrimitore, 
2011). Firms choose the central agglomeration strategy to minimize a total distance 
of transportation. The growth of the transport tariff leads to a decrease in the total 
profit. Due to information asymmetry, the leader's profit in all markets is twice as 
high as the profit of the follower (Fig. 3). 
In the bifurcation point begins to dominate the effect of reducing competition. 
Firms choose a differentiation strategy to monopolize adjacent markets. The 
growth of the transport tariff leads to an increase in total profits. The growth of 
total profit with growth of the transport tariff is due to the fact that when 
differentiation strategy, the firms supply more to adjoining markets and less to 
distant markets. Due to information asymmetry, the leader almost monopolizes the 
markets to the right of himself and at the same time is present in the markets to the 
left of the follower. This is clearly seen in Fig. 4. In the equilibrium state, for 
32=t , the leader in the follower "territory", [ ]disx,x 10∈ , receives 19,2% of the 
total profit both firms, and the follower in the leader "territory", [ ]12 ,xx dis∈ , 
receives only 1,9% of the total profit both firms. 
 
 
2F
t
( )aggagg x,xF 212
( )disdis x,xF 212
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Fig. 3 – Equilibrium profits of firms under central agglomeration 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 – Equilibrium profits of firms under differentiation 
 
 
 
( )aggagg* x,x,xF 211
( )aggagg* x,x,xF 212
31=t
x
( ) ( )xF,xF 21
aggagg x,x 21
x
32=t
( )disdis* x,x,xF 211
( )disdis* x,x,xF 212
( ) ( )xF,xF 21
disx1
disx2
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Conclusions 
 
The paper explores the spatial duopoly of firms under Stackelberg competition, when 
one of the firms is the leader in term of supply volume. The equilibrium spatial 
strategies of firms are found. In the process of the analysis of equilibrium stability, it 
is proved that the transport tariff is a bifurcation parameter for firms. It was found 
that the change in the central agglomeration strategy to the differentiation strategy 
occurs at the point of transcritical bifurcation. The conditions for full coverage of the 
markets for both strategies are defined. It is obtained that the information asymmetry 
leads to asymmetry of equilibrium locations of firms. It is established that under 
differentiation strategy, the follower can due to the space factor overcome 
information asymmetry in the nearest markets and get a profit more than the leader. 
It is proved that spatial differentiation enhances a market power of firms and allows 
monopolization of neighboring markets. 
The purpose of further research is to analyze the competitive interaction of firms 
in the Hotelling's linear city model under the conditions of other asymmetry types. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Anderson, S. (1987) Spatial competition and price leadership // International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 5, pp. 369–398. 
Brenner, S. (2005) Hotelling Games with Three, Four, and More Players // Journal of 
Regional Science, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 851–864. 
Patri, S. and A. Sacco (2017) Sequential Entry in Hotelling Model with Location Costs:  
A Three-Firm Case // Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location Using Game Theory, 
pp. 261-272. 
D’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J. and J.-F. Thisse (1979) On Hotelling’s «Stability in 
Competition» // Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 5, pp. 1145–1150. 
Economides, N. (1986) Minimal and Maximal Product Differentiation in Hotelling’s 
Duopoly // Economics Letters, Vol. 21, pp. 67–71. 
Gupta, B., Pal, D. and J. Sarkar (1997) Spatial Cournot competition and agglomeration in a 
model of location choice // Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 27, No. 3, 
pp. 261–82. 
Hamilton J. H., Klein, J. F., Sheshinski, E. and S. M. Slutsky (1994) Quantity competition 
in a spatial model // Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 903–917. 
Hamilton, J. H., Thisse, J.-F. and A. Weskamp (1989) Spatial discrimination, Bertrand vs. 
Cournot in a model of location choice // Regional Science and Urban Economics, 
Vol. 19, pp. 87-102. 
Hotelling, H. (1929) Stability in Competition // The Economic Journal, Vol. 39, No. 153, 
pp. 41-57. 
Irmen, A. and J.-F. Thisse (1998) Competition in Multi-Characteristics Spaces: Hotelling 
Was Almost Right // Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 76–102. 
Mazalov, V. and M. Sakaguchi (2003) Location Game on the Plane // International Game 
Theory Review. 
Neven, D. J. (1986) On Hotelling's competition with non-uniform consumer distribution // 
Economics Letters, Vol. 21, pp. 121-126. 
Scrimitore, M. (2011) Spatial discrimination, product substitutability and welfare // Bulletin 
of Economic Research, Vol. 63, pp. 231–244. 
Tabuchi, T. and J.-F. Thisse (1995) Asymmetric Equilibria in Spatial Competition // 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 13, pp. 213–227. 
 
Стаття надійшла до редакції 29.10.2018. 
